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Abstract 
In this paper we review and explore the strategic 
mechanisms which deter entry in banking. The existing 
models of entry deterrence in banking primarily 
highlight adverse selection as the main driving force 
behind deterrence. We show that adverse selection 
(emphasizing the asset side of bank balance sheets) is 
not a necessary condition for creating barriers to entry. 
Instead we rely on cost differences of different types of 
incumbents and show that even with private 
information about these costs there can be entry 
deterrence. In a one period model, a loan commitment 
option contract issued by banks is a sufficient signalling 
mechanism for deterring entry conditionally. Weak 
(high cost) banks cannot deter entry. However, in a 
multiperiod model where signalling is done through 
fighting at the spot market, the weak incumbent can 
also prevent entry in the initial periods though they 
cannot prevent it altogther. Further, incorporating 
adverse selection in the model does not create blockaded 
entry. 
Sect ion 1 : I n t r o d u c t i o n 
History testifies to the fact that there have been 
formidable barriers to entry in the banking industry in 
developed as well as less developed countries. One 
reason behind this has been regulatory protection. 
Different legislative barriers like exclusive banking 
charters (USA), monopoly over the right of note issue 
(France) or exclusive privileges regarding formation of 
joint stock banks (England) have been in force in 
different stages of banking history. Given the political 
and economic implications of stability of the banking 
industry and the allegedly destabilizing role of free 
competition1, it is easy to see why banking regulators 
came forward to give patronage and create entry 
barriers for the incumbents. Other reasons of regulatory 
barriers could be found in the subsidy requirements for 
agriculture (leading to protected and nationalized 
banking as in India or France) or the necessary 
protection for local business (creating interstate barriers 
in USA) or capital flight (which concerns the emerging 
market countries). Also, in many cases, concerns beyond 
pure public interest have created regulatory barriers. 
During monarchical rule in the European and Asian 
countries, loans to the Sovereign of the State have given 
the incumbent bank or a cartel of incumbents the 
monopoly right in banking in a particular territory, in 
specific products and with respect to certain clientele 
types. Bankers eager to cultivate profitable 
relationships with the Sovereign(s) of States and 
thereby acquire these special privileges used to offer 
loan commitments.2 While the history of banking is a 
story of protectionist regulation to a large extent, the 
recent past have seen a dramatic reversal of such 
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tendency with the weakening of regulatory barriers in 
different countries in the wake of financial liberalization 
and increasing faith in competition3.However, entry 
patterns have not been uniform across different States 
and regions. In Europe, despite the formation of the 
Union, cross border movement has been relatively 
small. The national banking markets of most of these 
countries are still remarkably segmented and well 
protected with an oligopoly of big banks commanding 
the major share of assets and a periphery consisting of 
small banks. In the United States on the other hand, 
the relaxation of interstate barriers have led to 
movements and consolidation across State lines. At the 
same time evidence on cross border branching show 
capital has an increasing tendency to move through and 
acquisitions of the US and Spanish multinational banks 
at a global level. In this context it is important to 
compare the global advantage of these multinational 
banks and the home field advantage of the local banks. 
Berger, Udell, Young and Genay (2000) test the 
competing claims of home field advantage hypothesis 
versus that of global field advantage hypothesis taking 
data on cross border banking in Spain, Germany, 
France, UK, and USA in the 1990s. Interestingly, while 
they reject unconditional global advantage hypothesis, 
they find that a limited form of global advantage 
hypothesis is not rejected against the (alternative of 
home advantage hypothesis) where the limited form is 
applicable to banks of a limited sample of countries with 
specific regulatory, organizational and industrial 
structures. What emerges is that entry or comparative 
advantage in international banking is conditional on the 
attributes of the home country environment of the 
potential entrants. While multinational banks from 
3 
USA have comparative advantage both at home and 
away, only a few countries have equal efficiency in 
foreign conditions and most countries have comparative 
advantage at home and disadvantage in foreign 
markets. While more such studies with data on within 
as well across the borders are warranted, it is evident 
that entry is conditional not only on a set of regulatory 
but natural barriers as well. One needs to develop an 
industrial organization model of banking that addresses 
this issue satisfactorily. 
There has been a proliferation of work on entry 
deterrence in the Industrial Organization Literature 
(10). Do we need separate answers on entry deterrence 
in banking other than the general theories on 
deterrence already put forward by this l i terature ? What 
do we learn from this literature when we try to use it in 
the context of banking industry? Let us look at some of 
the standard 10 way of looking at entry deterrence. 
Increasing returns - It has primarily focused on the 
strategic excess capacity creation effect by the 
incumbent(s) which can directly lead to entry 
deterrence. See for example, Spence (1977) and Dixit 
(1980) which use Stackelberg model of sequential 
capacity choices. The presence of increasing re turns in 
this industry certainly makes capacity creation a 
natural instrument for deterrence or blockade. 
However, in recent times, fixed costs of capacity creation 
have become less relevant due to rapid ra te of 
obsolescence in information gathering, processing and 
disseminating technology on which banking depends so 
heavily4. Under the threat of entry by a technologically 
sophisticated entrant, the only survival strategy of the 
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incumbent is to scrap his existing capacity and start 
with almost a new one or restructure and update the old 
technology heavily to adapt to the features of the new.5 
Therefore, what amount of capacity a bank has becomes 
highly irrelevant in toda£ s context and capacity 
embodied in systems architecture does not remain a 
credible threat for deterring entry. In fact, the higher 
rate of entry in banking as well as faster rate of 
technology adoption can be attributed to this cause 
apart from the obvious facilitating role of relaxed 
protective regulatory barriers in this industry. 
Further, the evidence on economies of scale in banking 
is mixed. Using data from the 1980s, Berger and 
Humphrey (1991) found that medium sized banks 
achieved the optimal scale while Berger, Hanweck and 
Humphrey (1987) found little evidence on scope and 
product mix efficiency. On the other hand, using the 
data from the 1990s Berger and Mester (1997) found 
significant scale efficiency for very large banks (though 
the sample size was too small to get firm conclusions). 
These analyses are not strictly comparable since the 
latter studies take into account the risk reduction and 
product mix benefits associated with increasing scale. 
Absolute cost advantages - Cost advantages for the 
incumbent can lead to limit pricing" tto> deter entry. One 
issue is whether such cost differentials are common or 
private information. Milgrom and Roberts (1982) 
address the point. They analyze a limit pricing game 
where the cost of the incumbent is private information 
and derive the conditions for separating and pooling 
equilibrium. Cost differentials can arise due to cheaper 
input procurement systems, or different regulatory and 
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organizational attributes. Economists have seriously-
started investigating the nature and source of cost 
differentials in banking. One study worth mentioning is 
Gehrig and Sheldon (1999) who conduct an analysis of 
scale, scope and x-efficiency of European banks and find 
significant cost differentials especially within the 
national borders. The major part of cost differential 
stems from differences in x-efficiency rather than 
economies of scale or scope. Berger, Udell, Young and 
Genay (2000) test the competing claims of home field 
advantage hypothesis versus that of global field 
advantage hypothesis taking data on dross broder 
banking in Spain, Germany, France, UK, and USA in 
the 1990s. Interestingly, while they reject 
unconditional global advantage hypothesis, they find 
that a limited form of global advantage hypothesis is not 
rejected against the (alternative of home advantage 
hypothesis) where the limited form is applicable to 
banks of a limited sample of countries with specific 
regulatory, organizational and industrial structures. 
What emerges is that entry or comparative advantage 
in international banking is conditional on the attributes 
of the home country environment of the potential 
entrants. While multinational banks from USA have 
comparative advantage both at home and away, only a 
few countries have equal efficiency in foreign conditions 
and most countries have comparative advantage at 
home and disadvantage in foreign markets. 
Other factors which can deter entry include product 
differentiation advantages, capital requirements, and 
contracts as a barrier to entry (Aghion and Bolton 
1987). The last one is particularly important given the 
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fact that incumbent banks can hardly use excess 
capacity as the deterrent. 
Let us now look at the new literature on financial 
intermediation tha t at tempts to explain entry 
deterrence. The most important paper so far has been 
that of Dell Ariccia, Friedman and Marquez (1999). 
They show that where only incumbent(s) can first 
screen and make accept/reject decisions on loan 
applicants, and entrant(s) can only screen after those 
accepted have already received credit in the first period, 
an adverse selection problem develops for the latter and 
blockades entry. This is basically that entrants cannot 
identify those rejected by the incumbents. This raises 
the screening costs and reduces profitability of entrants 
creating blockaded entry or deterred entry. Ariccia 
(1998) analyzes the effects of informational asymmetries 
on the market structure of the banking industry in a 
multi period model of spatial competition. Incumbent 
banks gather proprietary information about their clients 
in the process of lending, acquiring an advantage over 
potential entrants. This informational advantage may 
act as a barrier to entry unless the growth rate of new 
borrowers is sufficiently high. Finally, the paper shows 
that even in the absence of fixed costs, there will be a 
finite number of banks in the steady state. 
Gehrig (1998) tackles the issue of sequential 
competition and is similar to our model in spirit. He 
shows that when the above adverse selection problem 
exists for entrants, and, to reinforce that, incumbents 
can offer contracts that meets the lowest interest rate 
offered by entrants (competition meeting clauses), 
barrier to entry remains very high. However, to the 
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extent that screening costs are increased due to greater 
competition, both entrants as well as incumbents will 
have the incentive to reduce screening intensity. As a 
result there will be some entry but the asset qualities of 
banks may worsen severely due to negative effects on 
screening incentives. 
Hauswald and Marquez (2000) focus on the interaction 
of the adverse selection effect which curtails competition 
and the effect of competition on informational rent 
erosion. In their model, with increasing competition, 
banks tend to shift more resources in their core sector 
where they have closer relationships with clients (where 
the adverse selection problem for the competing 
entrants is greatest) and move away from the periphery 
where they give transactions loans. 
Boot and Thakor(2000) show that prospect of higher 
competition between banks forces them to develop 
relationships and customize services. As already noted 
in the basic 10 literature, this relaxes price competition 
and prevents rents from being completely competed 
away. However, they assume the threat of competition 
or entry to be exogenous and unaffected by the degree 
of relationship orientation. 
Our approach in this paper, is tha t of exploring the 
importance of different conditions for entry deterrence 
where we first turn to the contractual and cost 
difference aspects and later on integrate it with the 
adverse selection problem : 
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1. We show that cost asymmetry is a sufficient 
condition for entry deterrence even under incomplete 
information 
2. we show contractual variations in financing are 
permissible in the extended version of the model 
which retains the basic conclusion 
3. we show that first mover advantage is not a 
necessary condition for entry deterrence in a 
multiperiod setting 
4. We show that when adverse selection and cost 
asymmetry are simultaneously present, and 
screening takes place through contracts (in the 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) sense), entry is 
possible even when the incumbent has lower costs. 
Sec t ion 2 : The b e n c h m a r k mode l 
Contractual Time Structure 
There are two dates t = 0 and t = 1 which mark the 
beginning and the end of a contractual period 
respectively. At t = 0 a forward market for loan 
commitment opens where the incumbent bank can 
promise a loan to a borrower. At t = 1 the contract 
signed at t = 0 is either exercised or it expires at the 
option of the borrower. At t = 1 the spot market for 
credit opens. 
Borrower 
There is a single borrower who has no funds of her own 
and needs one unit of credit at t =1. Her project has 
return R. We assume that the borrower is non-strategic 
since it is depicted as a representative of the entire 
market. 
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Banks 
I: Incumbent 
There is a single incumbent bank. It can be of two types 
distinguished by it s cost funds rt (where i denotes type) 
and type can be strong (i = s) or weak ( i = w ) with 
probability p and 1 - p respectively. 
Al . r« > rs 
The incumbent knows it s type but others doi\ L 
E: Entrant 
The entrant appears at t =1. His cost of funds is re. 
A2. rw > re > r8 
The above inequality is the only interesting and non 
trivial case. Assuming the entrant s cost is higher than 
either type (rc > rw > r 8 ) rules out entry trivially and 
similarly assuming a cost advantage over both (r w r 8 > 
re ) generates entry with probability one in all states of 
nature. 
The game 
The following matrix gives the sequence of date event 
pairs: 
Date Event 
t = 0 Nature determines type T 
t = 0 Incumbent offers forward contract r(i) 
t = 0 Borrower accepts or rejects 
t = 1 Entrant decides on entry 
t = 1 Bertrand competition if entry 
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The incumbent can offer any rate of interest belonging 
to the real line R. Note that given the forward contract 
offer the entrant can make an inference about the type 
of the incumbent. Thus we have a posterior probability 
function qi(r(i)). The entrant can either enter or decides 
not to. Given the posterior beliefs of the entrant about 
the incumbent type, there is a optimal decision function 
of the entrant which maps each possible belief to a 
unique point in the binary action space of the entrant ( 
enter, dori tenter). 
Equilibrium 
As described above, we have in our hands, a dynamic 
game of incomplete information. The relevant 
equilibrium concept for this type of game is Perfect 
Bayesian Equilibrium. Therefore equilibrium of this 
signalling game G is a strategy profile [r(i) , dt(r(i) ] and 
posterior beliefs q.(r(i)) such t h a t : 
(i) Vi, r(i) e arg max Fli[ qi(r(i)) , dc(q>) ] 
(ii) Vr(i), dc(qO € arg max Fle[ r(i), qi(r(i)) ] 
(iii) For the information sets belonging to the 
equilibrium path of the game G, the posterior 
probabilities are related to the priors in the 
following way : 
= [ p(i) • p(r(i) I i) ] / I [ p(i). p(r(i) I i) ] 
(Baye£ Rule). 
We assume here that entrant wont enter if it does not 
make positive profit. Also; in case of Bertrand 
competition, there will be limit pricing by whoever has 
lower cost and the other one will drop out of the market 
if it makes zero profit at that interest rate. 
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Proposition 1: There exists a unique separating 
equilibrium (in pure strategies) where the strong 
incumbent deters entry and entry takes place if the 
incumbent is weak. 
Proof: 
Step 1. A separating equilibrium exists 
The strong type solves max r(s) - r a 
w.r.t r(s) 
s.t. r(s) < R (participation constraint) 
r(s) - rw ^ 0 (incentive compatibility) 
Given that rs < rw £ R . the optimal solution is r(s) = rw. 
Note that it just satisfies the participation constraint 
and that the weak type cannot mimic this contract with 
positive profit. 
When the entrant observes the contract it correctly 
infers that with probability one the incumbent is of 
strong type. Given that it cannot make a positive profit 
in case of a strong incumbent, deterrence results and 
the borrower has no option but to exercise the loan 
commitment. 
For all other contracts r the entrant infers tha t with 
probability one the incumbent is of weak type. 
Therefore, in such cases, it enters. 
Step 2. The equilibrium is unique 
Suppose there exists another separating equilibrium. 
For any other contract which satisfies the participation 
constraint and the incentive constraint above, r(s) < rw. 
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But this does not maximize the profit of the strong 
incumbent. So we get a contradiction and therefore the 
separating equilibrium is unique. 
Step 3. A pooling equilibrium does not exist 
In a pooling equilibrium, the strong type does not solve 
the no mimicking condition. Therefore r(s) = r(w) = R. 
Given this entry occurs since with probability (1 - p ) the 
entrant (correctly) believes the incumbent is of weak 
type in which case it will enter and bertrand 
competition will lead to a spot rate r*» at which the 
incumbent leaves the market. In case of a strong 
incumbent the entrant makes zero profit. So the 
expected profit of the entrant in a pooling equilibrium 
is (1 - p ) rw. So the entrant enters. Given this strategy, 
the strong type knows that bertrand competition will 
ensure that it can charge re only. Since re < rw therefore 
it is optimal for the strong incumbent to charge rw. But 
in that case there will not be any pooling equilibrium 
since the no mimicking condition is satisfied. 
QED. 
Section 3 : Contractual Variations 
A. Concessionary Finance to a Sovereign 
As mentioned before, loans to a Sovereign (especially 
during wars) were instrumental in acquiring monopoly 
rights in banking. The question that arises is under 
what conditions, incumbents would be able to persuade 
the Sovereign to accept the contract and deter entry. As 
we shall show here, a straightforward extension of the 
benchmark model answers this question. 
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Let there be two borrowers each demanding one unit of 
credit where the first borrower is the sovereign and the 
second is a subject of the sovereign. In exchange for a 
concessionary loan commitment contract to the 
sovereign, the incumbent demands an exclusive banking 
right. With exclusive charter it is a monopoly over the 
subject of the sovereign in the credit market and can 
charge a maximum interest rate rm > rw. In other 
words, it can charge such a high interest ra te that it 
makes a profit even if it is a weak type with a high cost 
of funds. Now, as before, we have a separating 
equilibrium where entry is deterred if and only if the 
incumbent is of strong type. To start with, one has to 
examine the expected interest rate of the sovereign if it 
rejects the forward contract offer6. 
If the type is strong, the interest r(S) charged to the 
sovereign, will be such that 
rm + r(S) - 2 re = 0 or r(S) = 2 rc - rm. 
If the type is weak, interest will be r(S) = 2 rw - rm. 
Therefore the expected interest rate faced by the 
sovereign if it rejects the forward contract is E(r) = p . (2 
re - rm) + (1-p) .(2 rw - rm). 
Now, this is less than 2 rw - rm , the minimum interest to 
be charged by the weak incumbent in order to break 
even. Therefore, the strong type will offer r(S) = E(r) and 
entry deterrence results as before when the type is 
strong. 
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B. S igna l l i ng t h r o u g h deb t a n d e q u i t y 
c o m b i n a t i o n 
In Japan and Germany, banks hold equity in firms 
where they have lent7. Relationship banking of this type 
is also associated with entry deterrence. We sketch a 
simple model where the use of equity contract (along 
with debt contract) is necessary for generating entry 
deterrence. 
A4 . An incumbent of type "i" can augment project 
return by x(i) amount where x(s) > x(w). 
This makes the signalling problem more difficult 
because now if the strong type wants to charge a higher 
interest rate in order to get compensation for its 
advisory role in the project, the weak can costlessly 
mimic such a high interest rate contract. Even if the 
contract makes the repayment conditional on project 
return enhancement, it may not be possible to separate 
the weak and the strong. For example, let the contract 
be (E(r) , x(i)) where E(r) is the fixed interest obligation 
of the debt contract and x(i) is return on the equity held 
by the bank. If E(r) + x(w) > rw then it is feasible for the 
weak type to mimic this type of contract. Therefore, the 
strong bank is forced to bring innovations in terms of 
the contract. What it can do viably is to write a written 
agreement to incorporate a penalty clause which 
punishes the advisor if the "promised return" is not 
forthcoming. 
Proposition 2. Entry deterrence takes place when the 
type is strong and for sufficiently high penalty rate n. 
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Proof: strong type solves max r(s) - r« 
wrt r(s), n 
subject to 
R + x(s) - r ( s ) R - E ( r ) 
r(s) - r w - n < 0 
Let r(s,+) be the return when the promised return x(s) is 
forthcoming. Let r(s,-) be the return when it does not 
materialize. 
The solution yields r(s,+) = E(r) + x(s) 
and n > E(r) + x(s) -rw 
so r(s,-) = E(r) + x(w) - n < rw 
r(s,-) is debt (fixed claim) 
r(s,+) —r(s, -) is equity (contingent claim) 
Section 4: Asymmetric Costs and Adverse 
Selection 
Our benchmark model can be easily modified to 
accommodate the adverse selection problem in the credit 
market. 
In this section we modify the benchmark model in the 
following way 
(I) there are two types of borrowers : the high type 
(denoted by the superscript h) has a marginal revenue 
<J>h8 from borrowing with probability ph and the low type 
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(denoted by the superscript 1) has a marginal revenue <{>i 
from borrowing with probability pi where 
pi <|>i < ph <j>i < rw < ph <J>h and 
(X)/(l-X) > (<j>hHj») /{(<|)h-<rw /pn)} 
(II) each bank faces a resource const ra in t : Bi . A.N + B2 
(1-A.)N = L 
where L is total loanable funds, X is the proportion of 
high type of borrowers, N is the total number of 
borrowers, Bi is the amount lent to high type and B2 is 
the amount lent to low type of borrowers. 
We have the following proposition. 
P r o p o s i t i o n 3: The strong incumbent will offer 
contract for the high type of borrower only. When the 
incumbent is strong the entrant will enter only if <|>i. pi > 
re (in this case the entrant will target the low type of 
borrower) and the entrant will not enter if re > <|>i. pi. 
When the incumbent is weak the entrant will enter and 
offer a contract for the high type. The weak type of 
incumbent will not offer any contract. 
P r o o f : We check the three cases where the incumbent 
gives loan to high, low or both types. 
(a) strong incumbent gives loans to type "h" only 
where (Ri, Bi) solves 
max. {Ri. ph - r . . BiJXN 
s.t. 
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Ph (4>h Bi - Ri) £ 0 
0 > {Ri. ph - rw . Bi}XN 
The no mimicking condition binds : {Ri . ph - rw . Bi} XN 
= 0 
then Ri = rw . Bi / ph 
OrRi /Bi =rw / ph 
where rw / ph < <t>H (so the other constraint is satisfied). 
Given this s t ra tegy: 
(i) whenever Ri/ Bi = rw / ph , the entrant believes the 
incumbent is strong and targets the low type 
where (R2, B2) solves 
max. {R2. pi - r e . B2}(1-X)N 
s.t. 
(<t>iB2-R2)>0 
(<j)i B2 -R 2 ) > (4)1 B1-R1) = Bi{({)i-(rw / ph)}< 0 
so at the optimum the participation constraint binds 
and the incentive constraint is satisfied : R2 / B2 = <f»i 
Note that this implies tha t incentive constraint for the 
high type is also satisfied 
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(<j)h Bi -R i ) = {(<j)h - (rw / pn)}L / (XN) £ (<j>h B2-R2) = (<j>h -
(j>i)L / ((1-X)N) 
Note that entrant enters only if re < <|>i. pi. 
(ii) whenever Ri/ Bi * rw / ph, the entrant believes the 
incumbent is weak and targets the high type 
where (Ri, Bi) solves 
max. {Ri . pi - re . Bi}(X)N 
s.t. 
(<J)hBi -Ri) > 0 
(<f»h Bi -Ri ) > (<|>h B 2 - R 2 ) 
and the weak incumbent maximizes 
max. {R'2. pi - rw . B2}(1-A.)N 
s.t. 
(<j)i B2 -R2) > 0 
((j)i B2 -R 2 ) > (<j)i Bt - Ri) 
Now we solve for the maximum payoff to the weak 
incumbent since it has the first mover advantage over 
the entrant. 
(4)1 B2 -R 2 ) = 0 
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Maximum payoff to the weak incumbent is n(w) = {(4>i pi 
- rw ) B2}(1-X)N < 0. 
So the weak incumbent will not offer any contract. 
Therefore, (<j)h B2-R2) = 0 and the incentive constraint 
for the high type is the same as the participation 
constraint in the entrant s optimization problem and the 
constraint binds. 
So, <{>h Bi = Ri 
So if re < <J)i. pi, then the payoffs are 
to the strong incumbent is FI(s, h) = (rw -rB)L 
to the weak incumbent is n(w, h) = 0 
- to the entrant is n(e, h) = p ({<j)i. pi - rc }L + (1-p) {(ph 
<j>h -re)L} 
If re £ 4>i. pi. then the payoffs are 
to the strong incumbent is n(s, h) = (rw -r6)L 
to the weak incumbent is I"l(w, h) = 0 
to the entrant is I"I(e, h) = (1-p) {(ph <t>h-re )L} 
(b) strong incumbent gives loans to type "1" only : given 
this the entrant will target the high type. 
For the strong incumbent (R2, B2) solves 
max {R2 . pi - r 6 . B2}(l->.) N 
(<J)i B2 -R2) > 0 
(4>i B2 -R2) > (4>iBi-Ri) 
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0 > {K-2. pi - rw . Ba}(l-X)N 
Note that the no mimicking condition is satisfied 
whenever the first constraint is satisfied. 
We check for the maximum payoff of the incumbent due 
to it s first mover advantage. 
The maximum payoff is achieved when ($1B2-R2) = 0. 
So the incentive constraint which the ent rant has to 
provide for the low type binds since 
(4>h Bi - R O > (<{>h B2-R2) = B2 ((<}>h - 4 0 > 0 
So Ri = 4>h L/(?iN) + L/((1-X)N) (<j»i -<j>h) < <j>h L/(XN) 
Note that the incentive constraint for the low type is 
satisfied since the participation constraint for the low 
type and incentive constraint for the high type are 
satisfied. 
If ph[<J)h L/(XN) + L/((l-?i)N) (<i>i — 4>h>] - r e . L > 0 then 
entrant enters, otherwise not. 
The payoff to the strong incumbent is (pi <j>i - r» )L < (rw -
rs)L. 
Therefore the strong incumbent will not find it optimal 
to give loans to low type only. 
® strong incumbent gives loans to both types 
Max {Ri. ph - r8 . Bi}A.N + {R2 . ph - r , . B2}(l->.) N 
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w.r.t. { (Ri .Bi ) , ( R 2 , B 2 ) } 
s.t. 
ph (<t>h Bi - Ri) > 0 
ph (4>h Bi - Ri) > ph (<|)h B2 -R2) 
pi (<})i B2 -R 2 ) £ 0 
pi (<{)i B2 - R 2 ) > pi (<j)i Bi - R I ) 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
resource constraint: 
BI . A.N + B 2 (1- X. ) N = L 
and no mimicking by the weak incumbent: 
0 > {R*I . ph - RW . B'JJXN + {R*2 . ph - RW . B*2}(l-X) N 
and the no destabilizing condition 
{(r, - r w ) . B*I}XN + {R*2 . ph - rw . B*2}(1-?I) N £ 0 
Note that since the objective function is linear in BI and 
B2 therefore we shall get a corner solution which implies 
lending to both types cannot be optimal. 
Therefore from the above analysis it is evident that 
strong incumbent will offer incentive compatible 
contract to high type only. 
Our results are comparable with Jan Bouckaert and 
Hans Degryse (2001) who show that small size entry 
occurs in banking if adverse selection effect is not too 
high or low. For low adverse selection effects there is 
QED. 
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large scale entry and for very harsh adverse selection 
effects there is no entry at all. 
Section 5 : I n t e r t e m p o r a l t r a d e o f f s in a two per iod 
model 
Here we consider a long lived incumbent whose type is 
private information and a sequence of entrants. The 
nature of equilibrium depends on prior probabilities and 
the cost parameters. There are two periods and each 
period has a forward market in the beginning and a spot 
market in the end. The basic idea here is that now a 
weak incumbent can sustain a first period loss if she is 
compensated though entry deterrence in second period. 
Given this, the signalling role is assumed by the spot 
market rate. As we shall see this leads to conditional 
entry deterrence by the weak type, and secondly 
redundancy of the forward contract. 
« 
Propos i t ion 4; If (rw - re) < 5( Ci - Fw) then for 
sufficiently high p, the weak incumbent can also deter 
entry in period 1. 
Proof : If (rw - re) < 5( Ci - rw) then it pays to fight in 
period 1 if that deters entry in period 2. Therefore if 
entrant 1 enters the weak incumbent will find it optimal 
to fight with a positive probability. If it s strategy is not 
to fight at a loss, then the entrant will believe she is 
strong with probability one if it fights and it will be then 
optimal to deviate from the strategy of not fighting. As 
Fudenberg and Kreps (1987) and Kreps and Wilson 
(1982) point out, the exact nature of the equilibrium will 
depend crucially on the prior p and the cost parameters. 
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To make the analysis interesting we assume that there 
is a fixed cost F of entry. 
(A) If (rw - r e ) (1-p) < F then there wont be entry in the 
first period. Therefore the priors will be unchanged and 
as a result no entry will occur in second period also. As 
mentioned in the one period model, a high enough fixed 
fee will trivially cause entry deterrence and does not 
seem to be a particularly interesting case. Now we turn 
to the more interesting case: (rw-re)(l-p)> F 
(B) Since (rw-re) (1-p) > F then entrant will surely enter 
in the first period if incumbent does not fight at a loss. 
It cannot be optimal for the weak incumbent to fight 
with probability one as the posterior probability will not 
be high enough to deter entry. Therefore the weak 
incumbent will randomize. This in turn requires that 
entrant in period 2 also randomizes because as long as 
entrant 2 finds it optimal to enter, weak incumbent will 
find it optimal to reduce the probability of fighting in 
period 1. Conversely, when the entrant 2 finds it 
suboptimal to enter because the posterior probability of 
strong given fighting ( at the price rw ) is too high, the 
weak incumbent will find it optimal to revise upwards 
the probability of fighting. Therefore at equilibrium the 
posterior q will be such that 
(rw - r e ) (1-q) = F 
or q = [(rw - r e ) - F ]/ (rw-r e) = a, say. (We assume [(rw-
re) - F ] > 0 since fixed fee is negligible.) 
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Now q must also satisfy 
* > 
q = p / [p + (l-p)Pl 
where p is the conditional probability of a weak 
incumbent fighting at a loss in period 1. Therefore P = p 
(1 - q ) / q (1 - p ) 
The total probability of fighting in period 1 is p . l + ( 1 -
p ) P = p/q. So entrant will stay out in period 1 if a < p/q 
or p > a2 .9 
QED 
Corollary : The equilibrium of the game is unchanged 
if the forward market does not open. 
Proof: If entry is deterred in period 1, then spot market 
monopoly is able to extract the entire surplus. The 
forward contract is not needed since signalling is 
completely done through the spot market competition. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we review and explore the strategic 
mechanisms which deter entry in banking. The existing 
models of entry deterrence in banking primarily 
highlight adverse selection as the main driving force 
behind deterrence. We show in this paper that adverse 
selection is not a necessary condition for entry 
deterrence. Cost asymmetry does equally well. To signal 
the cost of incumbent we have used the mechanism of 
loan commitments.10 The fundamental insight 
generated is that such contracts can convey incumbent 
strength and discourage entry when the incumbent is 
strong thus leaving the borrower no other choice but to 
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accept the preemptive contract. However, we show that 
forward contracts losfe their signalling value in 
multiperiod model and is substituted by the signalling 
role of spot market competition. We also show that 
when screening takes place through contracts and cost 
asymmetry is present, adverse selection need not deter 
entry. This result should alert us that it is not adverse 
selection per se but how it is modelled, which can lead to 
different conclusions about entry deterrence. 
Before finishing we should mention that the bank 
merger literature is also relevant for entry. In 10 
models, mergers are usually anti competitive and deter 
entry in an industry in most cases though there are 
exceptions to this general rule. In the banking context, 
we have seen a wave of mergers throughout the world in 
recent times though one is yet to arrive at a robust 
theory of causes and consequences of mergers. This is 
due to the controversy surrounding the issue of the 
degree of increasing returns present in banking and 
different kind of performances of merged banks in 
Europe and USA. Berger et al(1999) find that mergers 
among incumbents increase entry by de novo lenders. 
On the other hand Selig and Critchfield (1999) find that 
local market entry by acquisition deters concurrent 
entry by de novo banks and thrifts. Two aspects are 
highlighted in these studies : 1) mergers between big 
banks can cause a gap in small business lending which 
de novo banks are can fill up and 2) entry can take place 
by acquisition rather than branching. These indicate 
that the strategy choices for both incumbents as well as 
entrants can be quite rich. Also the types of incumbents 
(strong or weak, big or small etc) and entrants 
(established in other markets versus de novo lenders) 
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matter. This remains an interesting avenue for future 
theoretical research. As a preliminary conjecture, in our 
setup the entrant may have an incentive to merge with 
the strong type but prefer to take the weak type as a 
competitor (see Mallick and Moitra (2001) for more on 
this theme) if type-separating signals arise in 
equilibrium. 
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Notes 
1 Caminal, Ramon., Carmen Matutes (2000) 
2 One important example of this is the banking practices of 
the House of the Rothschilds see (Ferguson 1998). Also see 
Kennedy ((1989) in his discussion on finance, geography and 
the winning of wars. 
3 See Besanko, D. And A.V. Thakor (1992) 
^ See Kane E.J. (1984) 
5 For example, the large public sector banks in India which 
delayed the adoption of information technology saw their 
market share of credit worthy borrowers plunging. 
f) In contrast to the earlier case the Sovereign is a strategic 
borrower. 
7 See Cameron (1966) 
8 While we assume constant returns to scale here, our main 
conclusions are preserved in case of diminishing returns to 
scale. 
9 Note : More generally, for a multiperiod model of N periods, 
one can show by induction that the entrants stay out until the 
first period k such that p < ok. 
The expected interest rate of the borrower is the monopoly 
rate for the first N -k periods since it knows that entry will 
not take place. 
10 We have interpreted loan commitment in a broad way. For 
this we did not need any upfront fixed fees and penalties for 
not exercising the option. Therefore, one should be careful in 
comparing these strategic loan commitments with those 
commitment contracts which solve risk sharing or adverse 
selection problems. Since the orientation of the paper is 
towards entry deterrence rather than the contractual aspects 
of loan commitments, we feel justified in taking the above 
mentioned approach. 
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